This article explores West-African modes of mobilisations confronting the externalisation of European borders. At the hands of a secondary data analysis, this article critically examined the most recent publications in relation to this topic, guided by the following research question: How do West-African modes of mobilisations challenge EU mobility regimes? This research identified governments, local organisations, (potential) migrants, expelled migrants, media, academia and writers and transnational social movements as relevant actors with different modes of action. This research suggests that there are multiple West-African modes of mobilisations that challenge EU mobility regimes, confront the problematisation of non-sedentary lifestyles and see mobility as a strategy and a solution for a bottom-up process of globalisation and as an inherent part of West-African mobile societies; existing next to African modes of mobilisations that have become part of EU mobility regimes. The objective of this research is to promote future research by increasing the visibility and political agency of the transformative possibilities of African modes of mobilisations.
Introduction
The current shared EU course on African migration is the result of a struggle throughout different eras of EU involvement in Africa:
Colonisation, post-colonialism, development-cooperation and now securitisation (VENTURI, 2019) ; gradually focusing more on security and increasingly conceptualising migration as negative (SCHÖFBERGER, 2019) . While most EU involvement in West-Africa is officially directed at improving governance, behind this is hidden an agenda of securitisation, more specifically the curbing of migration; thereby ignoring that most migrants move and remain within Western Africa (VENTURI, 2019) .
The consequences of the restriction of intra-West-African movement that was common within the framework of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) is that many migration processes and employment opportunities in trade and transport become illegalised and communities lose their livelihood (BRACHET, 2018) . Overall, it seems as if good governance is merely a pretence to securitise Europe's external borders.
Ironically, this securitisation generates the same migration and security problems, that the EU wants to inhibit, because former intra-regional migrants, traders and drivers might not find another resort than migrating to Europe or taking up weapons (BRACHET, 2018) .
The externalisation of European borders has been in the focus of scholars for many years. However, there seems to be a lack of research on African modes of challenging these developments.
Therefore, this paper focuses on West-African modes of mobilisations against the externalisation of European borders. West-Africa was chosen as the area of interest because European borders are increasingly manifested in the Sahel and beyond.
At the hands of a literature review, this paper examines recent publications in relation to this topic, guided by the following research question: How do West-African modes of mobilisations challenge EU mobility regimes? The following sub-questions complement the analysis:
What are the processes in the externalization of European borders in West-Africa? What are the consequences for West-African mobilities?
The analysis is guided by the concept of mobilisation. Rather than presenting results, the objective is to promote future research and to delve into the actors involved, their strategies and their demands to increase the visibility and political agency of the transformative possibilities of African modes of mobilisations.
Conceptual framework
Within this paper, the term "EU mobility regimes" (Schapendonk, 2017) is used rather than EU border regime to emphasise that the EU regime consists of multiple strategies restricting mobilities. Following the example of Landau (2019) , I acknowledge that for the sake of analysis I use generalised conceptualisations of the European Union (EU) and Europe, and also (West-)Africa, that do not account for the complexities of these geographic and political bodies. This paper examines mobilisations. 'To mobilise' means to "organize and encourage (a group of people) to take collective action in pursuit of a particular objective" and "bring (resources) into use for a particular purpose", but also "make (something) movable or capable of movement."
(ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 2019). The use of the term 'mobilisations' allows an exploratory analysis and opens up space for various modes of private and public (non-) action (Ataç, Rygiel & Stierl, 2016) as response to EU mobility regimes and at the same time entails a deeper meaning of challenging the restriction of mobility through movement.
Methodology
This research is an attempt to challenge dominant biases in African migration research and is oriented at a constructivist epistemology, the belief that "meanings are constructed, interpreted, and constantly reconstructed by people in their perceptions and social interactions" (CASTLES, 2012, p.19) . This paper conceptualises migration as mobilities In this paper, I engage in empirical generalisation to extrapolate general knowledge (LUND, 2014) from a limited array of literature. This generalisation is inevitable due to this paper being a small scope literature review. I would like the reader to keep in mind that the objective of this paper is not the generation of empirical results, instead, I aim to discover "connections and relations, not directly observable, by which we can understand and explain already known occurrences in a novel way" (DANERMARK et al. 2002 , p.91 apud Lund, 2014 . and categorisation refer to the tracking of movements through surveillance systems and statistical collections; and the "sorting of "deserving" refugees and the highly skilled from ordinary, superfluous migrants". The sedentary subject and African space-time are created through awareness campaigns, stigmatisation and punishment of migrants, all aimed at fuelling feelings of patriotism and familial guilt, so that Africans contain themselves within their community, disconnected from global space-time (Landau, 2019, p. 178 ). This strategy of "containment development" aims at excluding Africans not only from European territory, "but from contemporary logics of mobility and global desire" (LANDAU, 2019, p.180).
Strategies of Externalisation
EU migration policies are informed by narrative frames of a "migration-development-security nexus" (SCHÖFBERGER, 2019, p.7).
However, Stern & Öjendal (2010, p. 22 ) criticise the assumption that security and development are "known and knowable processes conditions or states of being that intersect". Instead, their research shows that the two terms embody various meanings and relationships and how they can be enacted in different discourses to justify policies.
Mobilising against EU mobility regimes
"Over the past decade, we have witnessed an upsurge of political mobilisation by refugees, irregularised migrants, and migrant solidarity activists in the countries of the European Union, at its external borders (…) and in other parts of the world (…)" (ATAÇ et al., 2016, p.527-528) . The following part introduces African modes of mobilisations.
West-African governments
The EU's measures of curbing migration risk to affect local governance negatively and to inhibit local reforms and regional initiatives (VENTURI, 2019). The EU's "stick & carrot approach" forces the implementation of EU migration policies in exchange for amongst others development aid; pushing their needs and interests in the background and restricting their national sovereignty and competences (Schöfberger, 2019, p.4) .
Mobility restrictions cause discontent in the local populations.
Therefore, Venturi (2019, p.17 ) emphasises the need for governments to include local communities and authorities, for example, traditional chiefs, and to develop alternative strategies that strengthen the "resilience capacities of local communities" instead of imposing external solutions; and to ensure that security controls do not inhibit the freedom of movement.
Overall, Venturi's (2019) commercialised business with an interest in keeping the industry alive (Smith & Schapendonk, 2018) .
In addition, the EU's security concerns seem to rule out other topics such as social and political activism and participation which is merely addressed in small-scale projects (VENTURI, 2019) . Overall, the securitisation approach has increased inequalities and suppressed African actors with less political voice (SCHÖFBERGER, 2019). Local initiatives can defend the African migrants' interests, but also engage in compliance with the EU and attempt to prevent migration for example through anti-migration campaigns (SMITH & SCHAPENDONK, 2018 ). An example is the case of Senegalese mothers who protest against clandestine migration after having lost their family members (BOUILLY, 2016) . Overall, local actors challenge EU mobility regimes with various strategies including mobilising against mobility.
(Potential) Migrants
Through the securitisation of EU mobility regimes, low skilled African migrants, asylum seekers and rural communities are confronted with solid borders (Schöfberger, 2019 relationships with people from the Global North to obtain a positionality of global connectivity. Their broader aim is to end their often involuntarily immobility (Smith & Schapendonk, 2018) .
Another example of mobilisation is provided by Ndao (2012) 
Expelled migrants
Expelled migrants can become vocal public actors confronting expulsion policies from inside and beyond European borders through the support of expelled migrants associations. These associations transform the taboo and social marginalization associated with expulsion to a collective, political protest. On the forefront of this movement is the Malian Expelled Migrants Association (Association Malienne des Expulsés AME). These associations also exist in Mali, Togo, Cameroon and Senegal and they voice political demands not only to the EU but also to their own governments.
Their tools for protests are media events, demonstrations, debates, participation in international immigration summits etc (LECADET, 2017) .
This form of mobilisation is not entirely new but expands the 19 th -century workers' movements (LECADET, 2017) .
These associations sometimes collaborate with left African parties, such as the African Independence Party which stands for "pan-African, working class, anti-colonialist and socialist" politics (LECADET, 2017, p. 152) . Nevertheless, AME's strategy entailed the distancing from traditional politics, aiming at a more original representation of protests, with diverse forms of action, being aware of their vulnerability to political exploitation and hybridisation (Lecadet, 2017) . For example, some associations orientate their demands at existing migration laws and work within the frameworks of governments, the International Organization for Migration (OIM) and the EU (LECADET, 2017).
In contrast, the AME refuses existing migration laws and demands for "freedom of movement, the sovereignty of the Malian state as an argument in favour of the non-subjugation of its policies to French migration policies, and the denunciation of the inhuman nature of expulsions", asking for a new policy reflecting migrants' perspectives (LECADET, 2017, p.159) . The example of the AME shows how mobilisations can be built upon former movements and how tactics matter, because the migration industry will attempt to incorporate most mobilisations. Exner and Hochleithner (2018) analysed international media narratives of West-African mobility. The most dominant narrative is "the wave of the destitute", thus victimising and securitising the migrant; and constructing the Sahel as a threatening space of crisis, extending to Europe (EXNER & HOCHLEITHNER, 2018, p. 9 ). These authors (2018) conclude that media and policy narratives simplify the multi-causality of migration and ignore the perspective of West-African governments. Not only Western media narratives can strengthen European borders but also visual media strategies such as deportation movies screened in countries of origin (TYLER, 2018) . Muppidi (2013, p.330) would probably define these strategies as part of the "economy of colonial truth".
Media, academia & writers
Muppidi (2013) analyses within international relation studies, but I argue that the concept describes implicit strategies of EU mobility regimes. Muppidi (2013, p.307) criticises how the colonization of academia excludes other ways of learning and knowing. Berriane and Haas (2012) add that most research on African migration is funded and controlled by institutions of the Global North and consequently often reflects EU interests in security, for example by producing research on illegal migration and smuggling, thereby constructing migration as a problem. Landau (2019, p. 182) confirms this perspective by warning that "without a sound alternative base of knowledge and analysis, the European gaze will come to frame many Africans' self-understanding".
How can narrated borders be challenged? Muppidi (2013, p. 310) suggests that "if that 'object' of knowledge was something that we cared about and came to love, if it was presented not in its object-hood but in its intimate human relationship with us, then maybe a different orientation towards knowledge, responsibility, justice, and understanding might follow".
However, this suggestion lacks concrete implementation proposals, the only concrete proposition so far is Muppidi 's (2013) recommendation of Chinua Achebe's 'Things Fall Apart' as an example of resistance through a narration of perspectives from the lower Niger. Laney et al. (2016) point out that migrants and other actors have been using social media to challenge dominant, negative media representations. Landau (2019, p. 182 West-African authors challenge border narratives through their own narratives and social media opens more space for the voices of African migrants. Finally, the emergence of African transnational social movements challenges EU mobility regimes.
To conclude, there are multiple African modes of mobilisations that challenge EU mobility regimes, confront the problematisation of nonsedentary lifestyles and see mobility as a strategy and a solution for a bottom-up process of globalisation and as an inherent part of West-African mobile societies; existing next to African modes of mobilisations that have become part of EU mobility regimes.
This research has certain limitations. First, the literature presented is mostly written by Western scholars. Second, the cases presented are reductionist and cannot account for the complexity of the topic, however, this research merely attempts to shed light at African modes of mobilisations. Due to the scope of the paper, different actors and strategies are presented shortly, thereby opening space for the readers' thoughts.
Third, the writing is influenced by my own positionality, and by the frame of analysis established. Finally, this research is based on secondary data, in order to develop a greater understanding, a qualitative research approach is required that focuses on migrants' and relevant actors' agencies, capabilities and aspirations.
